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The most significant part of Wade Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
integrity consists of the User Differential Range Error (UDRE) and the 
Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error (GIVE). WAAS solutions are not
completely appropriate to determine the GIVE term within the entire
coverage zone taking in account real irregular structure of the
ionosphere. It leads to the larger confidence bounding terms and lower
expected positioning availability in comparison to the reality under geo-
magnetic storm conditions and system outages. Thus a question arises: is
the basic WAAS concept appropriate to provide the same efficiency of the
integrity monitoring for both “global differential correction” (i.e. 
clock, ephemeris et al.) and “local differential correction” (i.e. 
ionosphrere, troposhpere and multipath)? The aim of this paper is to 
compare official WAAS integrity monitoring reports and real 
positioning quality in US coverage zone (CONUS) and Canada area 
under geomagnetic storm con-ditions and system outages. In this 
research we are interested in compari-son between real GPS positioning 
quality based on single-frequency C/A ranging mode and HAL (VAL) 
values which correspond to the LP, LPV and LPV200 requirements. 
Significant mismatch of the information be-tween WAAS integrity data 
and real positioning quality was unfolded as a result of this comparison 
under geomagnetic storms and system outages on February 14, 2011 and 
June 22, 2015. Based on this result we think that in order to achieve high 
confidence of WAAS positioning availability alerts real ionospheric 
measurements within the wide area coverage zone must be involved 
instead of the WAAS GIVE values. The better way to realize this idea is 
to combine WAAS solutions to derive “global differential cor-rections” 
and LAAS solutions to derive “local differential corrections”.
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1. Introduction
T e Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)provides not only differential corrections, but alsoranging error associated confidence bounds to
ensure the integrity of the positioning service throughout
the United States and Canada. The WAAS Master 
Station calculates integrity data associated with its 
generated corrections at the required level of integrity 
for the intended flight operation. Integrity data is
provided in the form of rang- 
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ing error confident bounds which are broadcast within
WAAS coverage zone and is used in order to compute
the protection levels (PL) taking into account both all
relevant ranging error sources and local “satellite-user”
geometry. Depending on the flight operation, the user
equipment may either compute a Horizontal Protection
Level (HPL) or both a HPL and a Vertical Protection
Level (VPL). WAAS guarantees that the user’s actual
position error will be smaller than PL values during
99.99999% of the time. The following level accuracy
and availability for the WAAS coverage zone has been
accepted as:
1) Localizer Performance (LP) service is available
when the calculated HPL is less than 40 meters;
2) Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance
(LPV) service is available when the calculated HPL is
less than 40 meters and the VPL is less than 50 meters;
3) Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance to
200 foot decision height (LPV200) service is available
when the calculated HPL is less than 40 meters and the
VPL is less than 35 meters.
The receiver user compares the computed protection
levels with the alert limit (AL) thresholds established for
the horizontal plane (HAL) and the vertical plane (VAL)
for a selected phase of flight. If one of the protection
levels exceeds the corresponding alert limit, the receiver
provides an annunciation to the user [1].
The most significant part of the integrity data con-
sists of the User Differential Range Error (UDRE) and
the Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error (GIVE). The UDRE
characterizes the residual error in the fast and long term
“global” corrections of both ephemeris and reference 
oscillator associated errors. The UDRE is broadcast by 
the WAAS for each satellite that is monitored by the 
system and the 99.9% bound (3.29 sigma) of the 
residual error on a pseudo range after application of fast 
and long-term cor-rections is checked. The GIVE 
characterizes the residual error in the current 
ionospheric correction (IC), for the estimated 
ionosphere signal vertical delays are calculat-ed for 
each of WAAS ionospheric grid point (IGPs) and
broadcasted every 5 minutes [1]. Since the true ionospher-
ic delay and multipath error are not precisely known, the
estimated variants in these error sources are added to the
UDRE, before comparing it to the residual error [2].
It is obvious that reliability of WAAS service integrity
depends on how the UDRE and GIVE confidence bounds
correspond to the real positioning environment. It is well
known that current availability of WAAS service strictly
depends on both the quality of each individual satellite
vehicle (SV) ranging and SVs constellation geometry
at the user’s location. Positioning delusion of precision
(PDOP) describes local “satellite-user” geometry and 
it is unique and unpredictable for each particular
user within the WAAS coverage zone. Hence the
confidence bounds are established according to the 
expected UDRE and GIVE values.
For the WAAS, ionospheric ranging errors are the
most significant and unpredictable. The horizontal and,
especially, the vertical positioning availability are easi-
ly to be disturbed in the ionosphere [3]. At mid-latitudes
such disturbances mostly appear during the main phase
of geomagnetic storms and can cause both increasing
ranging error and some short outages of GPS SVs [4,5,6].
Nevertheless a user derives the GIVE value anywhere
in the coverage zone based on the interpolation 
solutions from the nearest WAAS ionospheric grid 
points (IGPs) data to compute individual protection 
levels. In our opin-ion such a method of the 
ionospheric signal delays data treatment to get GIVE 
confidence bounds is not able to deal with undetected 
multi-scale ionospheric disturbanc-es and yields high 
probability of false alarm of the HAL (VAL) exceeding. 
As WAAS solutions are disable to de-termine the GIVE 
term within the entire coverage zone taking in to 
account the real irregular structure of the ionosphere 
it leads larger confidence bounding terms and lower 
expected positioning availability in comparison to the 
reality under geomagnetic storm conditions.
The aim of this paper is to compare official WAAS
integrity monitoring reports [www.nstb.tc.faa.gov/Dis-
playDailyPlotArchive.htm] and real positioning quality
in US coverage zone (CONUS) and Canada under
geomagnetic storm conditions and system outages. In
this paper we are interested in the comparison between
real GPS positioning quality based on single-frequency 
C/A mode and HAL (VAL) values which corre-spond 
to the LP, LPV and LPV200 requirements. The aim 
of such research is to make a first step to answer the 
question: “Can we use the WAAS typical solutions to 
provide LPV and LPV200 service outages alerts with
required confidence taking in to account the real envi-
ronment for the future GNSS SBAS?”
2. Data Sources and Experimental Environ-
ment
We conducted our research under geomagnetic storms
condition on February 14-15, 2011 and June 22-23,
2015. Table 1 collects these storms parameters based on
geomagnetic data from [https://cdaweb.sci.gsfc.nasa.
gov/]. The main parameters of geomagnetic storm such
as the time of sadden commencement (Tssc), periods of
the initial phase (IP), the main phase (MP) and the re-
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covering phase (RP) as well as the variations of the hori-
zontal component of the geomagnetic field (Ht) were de-
rived from the high-latitude ground-based magnetometer
data at Hampton, Alaska (Lat 64.9, Long 212.1) [https://
cdaweb.sci.gsfc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/eval1.cgi].
Comparison of the above mentioned geomagnetic
events displays that the February 14-15, 2015 event has
short MP period, weak geomagnetic, hence, ionospheric
disturbances and can be considered as a moderate geo-
magnetic storm. In contrast to that the June 22-23, 2015
event is a strong geomagnetic storm which has a long
MP period and should be accompanied with significant
ionospheric disturbances and can bring significant im-
pact on WAAS and GNSS performance.
Table 1. The geomagnetic storms characteristics
Date
(yy-mm-
dd)
3-hour 
Kpmax
TSSC,
UTC
IP
period
MP
period
RP
period
Htmin,
nT
Htmin -
Htmax, 
nT
2011-
02-14 4 16.00
16.00-
20.30
20.30-
23.30
After
23.30 12420
12420-
12830
2015-
06-22 8 05.30
05.30-
12.30
12.30-
20.00
After 
20.00 11500
11500-
13000
Usually weak geomagnetic storm is unlikely to
induce strong ionospheric disturbances into the mid-lat-
itudes ionosphere. As it was found earlier [7] the multi-
scale ionospheric disturbances propagates toward the
mid-latitudes from the expanding south boarder of the
auroral oval which is considered as a source of acous-
tic-gravity waves. The area of the auroral oval boarder
expands as the further the stronger geomagnetic storm is.
So it is unlikely that a weak geomagnetic storm on Feb-
ruary 14-15, 2011 is able to inspire strong travelling ion-
ospheric disturbances toward the mid-latitudes. There for
the real ionosphere shall not be significantly disturbed
in mid-latitudes and the expected WAAS area coverage
zone should not shrink as a result of the ionospheric dis-
turbances than.
On the other hand, strong geomagnetic storm, like the
event on June 22-23, 2015, can bring serious WAAS per-
formance deterioration. Thus it would be interesting to
compare the official WAAS alerts and real GPS position-
ing quality under both weak and strong geomagnetic
storm conditions. That was the reason why we choose
the above mentioned days for our research in this paper.
The WAAS official data source [http://www.nstb.
tc.faa.gov/DisplayDailyPlotArchive.htm] issued alert
reports for the CONUS zone. Fig. 1 a,b displays percent
of CONUS area covered with LP, LPV and LPV2000
services versus Greenwech Mean Time (GMT) time on
February14 (panel b) and 15 (panel a), 2011.
Figure 1. Percent of CONUS area covered vs GMT for 
the day of  the main phase of geomagnetic storm on 
Feb.14, 2011(panel b) and for the day of recovering phase 
of  the geomagnetic storm on Feb 15, 2011 (panel a)
Regardless the main phase of the geomagnetic storm 
that took place on February14, 2011, we can see that there 
is no significant coverage zone shrinking for LP, LPV and 
LPV200 service on this day. However we have WAAS 
alert of sharp shrinking of the coverage zone at about 
17.40 GMT on February 15, 2011 for LPV200 service. 
This time period corresponds to the end of the recovering 
phase of the geomagnetic storm. Thereby the ionospheric 
disturbances are not the probable source of the WAAS 
coverage zone shrinking here.
Figure 2 displays daily WAAS CONUS LPV and 
LPV200 coverage versus date and daily Kp indices for a 
period from January 1st till April 1st 2011 [8]. One can see 
that sharp shrinking of the WAAS CONUS coverage zone 
for LPV and LPV200 took place on February 15, 2011 as 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jasr.v2i1.343
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well. WAAS CONUS LPV and LPV200 percent of area 
covered is reduced down to 89% and 73% correspondent-
ly.
Figure 2. Daily percent of CONUS WAAS area coverage
and Kp values versus time[8]
The WAAS service degradation can be caused by not
only the ionosphere impact but also by the WAAS and
GPS segments outages. Table 2 contains a list of the sys-
tem outages which took place on February 14 and 15 2011
[8]. According to the Table there was GEO Uplink Subsys-
tem (GUS) event for the geostationary satellite GEO138
on February 14, 2011. This event did not cause the LPV
and LPV200 outages on this day thanks to the other
GEOs, which were used to broadcast WAAS corrections.
There was a long outage for GPS SV PRN 21 (from
11.15 till 20.05 GMT) and short outage for GPS SV PRN
4 (from 11.32 till 11.43 GMT). It means that there 
were two GPS SV out of service within the period 
from 11.32 till 11.43 concurrently. These events do not 
have time coincidence with the WAAS alert picture 
(Fig. 1) for whole CONUS zone, but according to the 
WAAS forecast these outages brought LPV and LPV200 
service outage in California, the USA North-Central, 
Arizona and Florida on February 15, 2011.
Fig. 3 a,b displays percent of Canadian area covered
with LP, LPV and LPV2000 services vs GMT on June 20
(panel a) and June 22 (panel b), 2015 [http://www.nstb.
tc.faa.gov/DisplayDailyPlotArchive.htm]. 
Figure 3. Percent of Canadian area covered vs GMT for
the day of  the geomagnetic storm on June 22, 2015 (panel
b) and for the background day on June 20, 2015 (panel a)
Based on the Fig 3, we can see that there was signifi-
cant degradation of all the LP, LPV and LPV-200 services
coverage in Canada from about 19:30 GMT till 21:30
GMT on June 22nd. This time period corresponds to the
main phase of strong geomagnetic storm (see Table 1).
Fig 4 displays an apparent time coincidence between high
Kp=8 and sharp deterioration of LPV and LPV200 
services coverage in Canada on June 22, 2015 as well [9].
Table 2. WAAS and GPS events on February 14 and 15, 2011
Start Date End Date Location/ Satel-lite
Service Affect-
ed Event Description
02/14/11 02/14/11
GEO138, 
Woodbine 
(QWE)
All GUS switchover, Woodbine faulted. TOW 127889-127902 
02/15/11 02/15/11 PRN21 All 
NANU 2011015. 
There was a NANU 2011015 on PRN 21 from 11:15am to 20:05pm GMT and SV Alert 
on PRN 4 (11:32am-11:43am), which both affected LPV and LPV200 coverage;
W1623D2 LPV Outages: 
1. California outage due to SV alert on PRN 4; 
2. North-Central and Arizona outages due to NANU on PRN 21 
LPV200 Outages: 
1. California outage due to SV alert on PRN 4; 
2. North-Central, Arizona and Florida outages due to NANU on PRN 21;
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Figure 4. Daily percent of Canada LPV and LPV200 ser-
vice area coverage and Kp values versus time
Table 3 contents the LPV (LPV200) service degrada-
tion event description. In contrast to the previous case (see 
Table 2) the service degradation for all the North America 
coverage zone is caused by the ionospheric disturbances 
as a result of strong geomagnetic storm on June 22-23, 
2015 [9].
According to Table 3 there were no GPS/WAAS seg-
ment outages during the event on June 22, 2015 so we can 
be sure that the LPV and LPV200 service degradation was 
caused with elevated GIVE values as a result of the iono-
spheric geomagnetic disturbances. As all the events took 
place during the MP and the beginning of the RP of the 
geomagnetic storm we can probably consider the LPV and 
the LPV200 service degradation as a result of the trav-
elling ionospheric disturbances from the pulsing auroral 
oval border [7].
3. Data Sources and Data Treatment
To compare the WAAS alerts to the real positioning 
quality we utilized RINEX 2.0 data files with 30-s time 
resolution which are available on [http://lox.ucsd.edu/
pub/rinex/]. These data corresponds to GPS-sites which 
are placed in CONUS and Canada zones. For our research 
goals 70 sites in CONUS zone (excluding California) and 
30 sites in Canada were chosen. The CONUS sites were 
equipped with the same GPS receiver type Trimble in or-
der to avoid influence of the apparatus features of different 
GPS receiver type to our final results. Unfortunately there 
were not enough sites equipped with the same type of 
receivers in Canada. These Canadian sites were equipped 
with different types of receivers such as TPS Net, Leica, 
Ashtech, Trimble, AOA and Turbo-Rogue. The map of 
these sites location for both CONUS and Canada zones is 
displayed in Fig.5.
Figure 5. A map of the GPS-sites location within CONUS
and Canada zone coverage zone
Firstly, it is interesting to compare the WAAS alert fig-
ures (Fig1-4) and the real positioning quality in CONUS
and Canada coverage zone. In order to do this a percent
of area coverage with the real positioning service for CO-
NUS and Canada zones was derived, based on the RINEX
data for each of GPS-sites (Fig 5) in one-frequency with
the GPS standalone mode. TEQC software [10] was utilized
to get navigation solutions and the correspondent position-
ing errors for the GPS-sites. Doing this, we did not use the
ionospheric correction and GPS SV outages report (Table
2) in order to simulate that GPS standalone mode which
Table 3. WAAS and GPS events on June 22, 2015
Start
Date
End
Date
Location/
Satellite
Service
Affected Event Description
2016/06/22 2016/06/23
Washington D.C.
(CnV),
Los Angeles (CnV),
Atlanta (CnV)
LPV_All,
LPV200_All,
Geomagnetic activity (Kp = 8 ) disturbed the ionosphere causing el-
evated GIVE values. This resulted in significant degradation of: (1) 
LPV-200 service coverage in Canada from about 19:45 GMT until 
21:35 GMT on June 22nd. The elevated GIVE values also resulted in 
moderate degradation of: (1) LPV service coverage in Canada from 
about 19:45 to 21:16 GMT on June 22nd; (2) LPV-200 service cover-
age in CONUS (Northeast) from about 19:45 to 21:07 GMT on June 
22nd. The elevated GIVE values also resulted in minor degradation 
of: (1) LPV service coverage in CONUS (Northeast) from about 19:45 
to 20:45 GMT on June 22nd and LPV-200 service coverage in Alaska 
from about 20:16 to 20:26 GMT on June 22nd 
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corresponds to the worst case of positioning conditions.
In case of mismatch of alert figures from the WAAS 
output and TEQC output we need to involve another in-
dependent solution for HPL (VAL) computation to decide 
which alert corresponds to the real environment better. 
In order to do it, we compute HPL (VAL) values based 
on the real ionospheric ranging error statistics, instead of 
GIVE values for each GPS site within CONUS and Can-
ada zones. Taking all of this in to account, our strategy of 
the data treatment includes following steps:
1)  Getting the navigation solutions with 30-s time 
resolution for each GPS site (Fig.5) utilizing RINEX 
within one-frequency C/A ranging data and TEQC soft-
ware. Once the navigation solution had been received 
we computed the positioning errors of each GPS site and 
transform the error values from rectangular Earth-centered 
coordinate system to the local coordinate system;
2)  Comparison between the LP, LPV and LPV200 
alarm limits (HAL and VAL) and real positioning errors 
which were computed at the pervious step. Every time 
when positioning error exceeds correspondent alarm limit 
a positioning fault is fixed for the GPS site according to 
LP, LPV or LPV200 limits particularly. Finally the real 
percent of the area covered for CONUS or Canada zone is 
computed as following:
( )
%of Area covered 100%TOT FLT
TOT
N N
N
−
= ⋅  (1)
Where NTOT is total amount of GPS-sites within the
area under consideration; NFLT is the number of the GPS-
sites where the current positioning errors exceed either the
VAL or HAL values according to the LP, LPV or LPV200
services.
3)  A computation current HPL and VPL values taking
in to account the real ionospheric ranging errors instead of
correspondent GIVE values. In order to do this, a “model
ranging” and real SVs constellation were utilized for each
GPS-site within the CONUS or Canada zone. Here we de-
fine “model ranging” as following:
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
, ,
2 2 2
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, 2
1
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f
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−
  (2)
Where: x0,i,y0,i,z0,i and xUS,yUS,zUS are i-th SV position 
and user’s position in the rectangular Earth-centered co-
ordinate system. These data can be found or computed 
from the correspondent RINEX files; TECi is ionospheric 
total electron content along the “i-th SV-user” line-of-site 
(in TECU, 1TECU=1016 1/m2); f1=1575.25 GHz and f2= 
1227.75 GHz are the GPS operation frequencies; C1i is C/
A-code ranging at frequency f1  and P2i is P-code ranging 
at frequency f2 which can be derived from RINEX obser-
vation file for each SV in view.
Computation of the HPL and VPL protection levels for 
a “model ranging” (2) and the real SVs constellation for 
each of the GPS-sites can be done as following [11]
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Where KHNPA=6.18 is a coefficient of confidence bounds
in horizontal plane for non-precise landing approaching;
KHPA=6.0 is a coefficient of confidence bounds in hori-
zontal plane for precise landing approaching with vertical
guidance; KVPA=5.33 is a coefficient of confidence bounds
in vertical plane for a precise landing approach with ver-
tical guidance; G is current “SV-user” angular geometry
matrix; W is diagonal ranging errors weighting matrix; σi
is a standard deviation of the “model ranging” error (2)
for i-th SV.
As we need to find σi – values for each SV in the view
before the HPL and VPL computation it means that we
have to accumulate simultaneous ranging values within
some time interval. The time interval of ∆T= 5 min was
used in our computation here.
4)  A comparison between the current HPL and VPL
values (3) and correspondent alarm levels of LP, LPV and
LPV200 services for each GPS-site from CONUS or Can-
ada areas and the percent of area covered computation (1)
than.
To model the ranging time series (2) based on the real
data from the correspondent RINEX files the double-fre-
quency P1 (or C1) - P2 “code-code” combination was
utilized. It means that the current ∆Rion,i value (2) contents
not only the pure ionospheric signal delays but also the
residuals of all the frequency dependent ranging errors,
such as multipath error and differential code biases (DCB)
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in SV and the receiver equipment. 
In order to understand the final results clearly we 
should evaluate expected ranging errors before getting 
navigation solution from the “model ranging” data. Based 
on a long time research it has been accepted that the most 
probable value of the vertical user ionospheric range error 
(UIRE) can be assumed in the WAAS solutions as follows 
[11]
,
9.0 0 20
4.5 20 55
6.0 55
PP
UIRE V PP
PP
m
R m
m
φ
φ
φ
 ≤ ≤

∆ = < ≤
 <


 

  (4)
Where φPP is the latitude of the ionospheric pierce 
point.
To transform this vertical range error into the corre-
spondent slant error value we can use following equation 
[12]
0.52
, ,
2
cos( )1 EUIRE SLT UIRE V
E F
R ELER R
R h
−
  
 ∆ = ∆ ⋅ −   +  
  (5)
Where RE =6378.1363 km is the Earth radius; hF2=350 
km is the height of the F2 layer electronic density maxi-
mum concentration; ELE is a SV elevation angle. 
Based on the IGS statistics of the expected ionospheric 
TEC grid forecasting the 1-sigma confidence bounds of 
this parameter should be within 2-9 TECU (correspondent 
UIRE is from 0.32 to 1.44 m). 
The absolute value of standard mean of the SV DCB 
shall not exceed 15 ns (4.5 m). The main DCB can be 
either positive or negative. The random variations of this 
value shall not exceed 3 ns i.e. 0.9 m (two sigma). In a 
reality SV DCB differs significantly for different types 
of SV and can vary within +/- 12 ns (i.e. +/- 3.6 m) from 
one SV to another. SV DCB value has a long lasting trend 
changing as much as 0.3-0.5 ns per year [13,14]. 
DCB values for the GPS receiver strictly depends on 
the receiver type and environment condition. According 
to [14] it was found that, the absolute value of receiver 
DCB can vary within +/- 40 ns (i.e +/-12 m) for the 
Trimble 5700 and Trimble NETP types. The random 
variations of this value (1-sigma) shall not exceed 2 ns 
(0.6 m). Like the previous item, the mean of this code 
delay can be either positive or negative and have the 
long annual trend. 
There are many evaluations of multiphase effects on 
the GNSS performance [15,16]. This error is usually consid-
ered as zero-mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation 
which depends on the SV elevation angle as following [11].
O0.13 0.53 exp 10
i
MPH
ELE
σ
− = + ⋅  
 
  (6)
Based on (6) the one-sigma confidence bound of mul-
tipath error standard deviation is within 0.13 – 0.4 m de-
pending on the SV elevation angle.
Taking into account all the above mentioned compo-
nents we can expect that standard mean of the ∆Rion,i val-
ues (2) which were derived from the RINEX (P1(C1)-P2) 
data is expected to be from -3.2 to 28 m and correspondent 
standard deviation is from 0.8 to 4.2 m. Figure 6 displays 
daily values of standard mean and standard deviation of 
∆Rion,i values which were derived from RINEX data uti-
lizing (2) for each GPS-site in CONUS area. One can see 
that all these values are within the previously computed 
borders. There is no significant difference between these 
data on February 14 and 15, 2011. Figure 7 displays the 
same data which were derived from RINEX data for each 
GPS-site in Canada.
Figure 6. Daily Standard Mean and Standard Deviation 
of the ionospheric ranging errors derived from the RINEX 
data corresponding to the GPS sites which are within CO-
NUS zone on February 14 (left panel) and February 15 
(right panel), 2011
Two groups of the daily standard mean of ∆Rion,i values 
can be recognized in Fig 6 according to their values. First 
group of the standard mean values lies within 10-20 me-
ters but another group is within 2-10 m. This difference 
probably can be explained with different type of antennas 
and GPS receivers which are set on different GPS-sites 
under our consideration. On the other hand there is no 
such a significant difference between standard deviation 
values which were taken from the same data series. All 
the values vary within the 1.5-3.7 m on both February 14 
and 15, 2011.
Regardless the Canadian GPS-network contain the 
GPS receivers of several types, similar features of the 
daily standard mean and standard deviation can be seen in 
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Fig.7. Most of the daily standard mean of ∆Rion,i values lie 
within 2-10 m. On the other hand a bit higher standard de-
viation values can be seen here. All the values vary within 
the 1.6-4.2 m on both June 20th and 22nd, 2015.
Figure 7. Daily Standard Mean and Standard Deviation
of the ionospheric ranging errors derived from the RINEX
data corresponding to the GPS sites which are within Can-
ada on June 20th (left panel) and June 22nd (right panel),
2015
3.1 Real Positioning Quality and WAAS Alerts
Comparison
Positioning quality is considered at the standpoint of the
protection cylinder concept[1]. This protection cylinder, is
centered on the user’s calculated position and represents
the uncertainty of the position according to user’s true po-
sition at each time point. In our research the data from the
GPS-sites with constant position is used. Thus user’s true
position can be considered as known.  On the other hand
the alert limit cylinder is utilized to check if the current
positioning accuracy corresponds to LP, LPV or LPV200
required positioning accuracy. The alert limit cylinder is
centered on the user’s calculated position, just as the pro-
tection level cylinder, and defined with the HAL and VAL
borders. In case if the user’s calculated positioning errors
exceeds either the VAL or HAL values, it means that re-
quired positioning accuracy is not available.
The percent of area covered (1) was computed for the
LP, LPV and LPV200 alert limits particularly. To evaluate
positioning quality from TEQC output data we did not use
any ionospheric correction in order to pure the prob-able 
ionospheric impact better. Fig.8 displays the percent of 
CONUS area covered versus UT. Can be seen that the
percent of area covered was not decreasing lower than
82% for all protection limits neither on February 14th (the
main phase of geomagnetic storm) nor on February 15th
(recovering phase of geomagnetic storm).
Figure 8. TEQC output: percent of CONUS area covered
vs Time on Feb. 14 (left panel) and on Feb. 15 (right pan-
el), 2011. Red lines mark approximate time points which
correspond to WAAS alerts (see Fig 1a).
Comparison between these results and the WAAS offi-
cial alerts (Fig.1,2) displays following:
1) TEQC output data analysis displays that position-
ing quality is worse within the time period from 15.00
to 23.00 UT on February 15 in comparison to the same
time on the previous day. This time period corresponds
to the end of recovering phase of the geomagnetic storm
(Table 1). Hence the percent of area coverage shrinking is
not likely caused with the ionospheric geomagnetic dis-
turbances in this time period. According to Table 2, there
was a long SV PRN 21 outage from 11.15 till 20.05 UT,
so it can be considered as a probable source of positioning
quality deterioration within CONUS coverage zone in the
period before 20.05 UT.
2) There are two apparent periods of the CONUS area
covered shrinking on February 15th, 2011. The first period
lasts from 14.30 to 18.00 UT and generally coincides with
the WAAS alerts (Fig.1 a). But according to the 
TEQC output data the real positioning quality is worse 
within the second period from 19.30 to 22.00 in 
comparison to the period from 14.30 to 18.00 UT. 
However WAAS does not provide any alerts for this 
second period of positioning quality decreasing;
3) WAAS alerts displays the lowest percent of the CO-
NUS area covered which is less than 70% at 17.40 UT
for LPV200 service (Fig.1 a). This value is much lower
in comparison to the correspondent TEQC output results
with is about 90% at the same time point (Fig. 8, right
panel). We can consider such a mismatch as probable false
alarm event in WAAS output.
4) There are certain events of the positioning quality
deterioration at 09.00-09.30 UT, at about 15.00 UT and
at about 20.00 UT for both Feb.14th  and 15th, 2011. As
these events take place on both days and at the same time
points they probably have nothing to do with ionospheric
disturbances.  These events can be probably caused by
such regular events as “local spots of bad visibility” of the
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jasr.v2i1.343
18
Journal of Atmospheric Science Research | Volume 02 | Issue 01 | January 2019
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
GPS SV constellation. Such events can bring periodic reg-
ular variations of the local PDOP values which can repeat 
and move in local areas. 
Generally there is a significant mismatch between 
TEQC output data and the WAAS alerts figure on both 
February 14 and 15 2011. It can be explained as we did 
not use any ranging corrections and we get the lower per-
cent of the area covered in comparison to the WAAS alert 
figure. Some cases, however, can be considered as prob-
able WAAS output mismatch information or false alarm 
but in order to prove it we need to crosscheck the data 
involving additional independent means of positioning 
availability control. 
Fig.9 displays the percent of Canada area covered ver-
sus UT. We can see that the percent of area covered was 
not decreasing lower than 80% for all protection limits 
neither on June 20th (background day) no on June 22nd 
(initial and main phases of the geomagnetic storm).
Figure 9. TEQC output: percent of the Canada area cov-
ered vs the UT on June 20th (left panel) and on June 22nd
(right panel), 2015. The red rectangle marks the time peri-
od which corresponds to the WAAS alerts (see Fig 3b)
In contrast to the previous case the WAAS official alert
gives significant percent of area covered shrinking which
is expected from 19.45 to 21.35 UT on June 22, 2015 as a
consequence of the strong geomagnetic storm (see Table
3). On the other hand there were not cases of the system
outages on June 22nd, thereby the positioning deterioration
events can be certainly considered as consequence of the
ionospheric geomagnetic disturbances. According to Fig 9
we can find following results:
1) TEQC output data displays that positioning quality
is generally worse on June 22nd, 2015 in comparison to the
previous geomagnetically quiet day. It is especially true
for the time period from 17.30 to 22.00 UT on June 22nd
(Fig. 9, right panel). This time period partially coincides
with the WAAS alert (Table 3) but TEQC output data gets
85% of the lowest % of area covered that is in 20% higher
in comparison with the WAAS alert data (Fig.3b).
2) Like the previous case there are certain events of
the positioning quality deterioration at 05.00 UT, at about
14.00 UT, at about 21.30 UT and at 23.30 UT for both
June 20 and 22, 2015. As these events take place on both
days and at the same time periods they can probably be
explained with the regular variations of the local PDOP
values like previously.
3) There is a period of significant shrinking of the % of
area covered at about 05.00 to 05.30 UT on June 20, 2015
(Fig 9, left panel). It was a background geomagnetically
quiet day so this event has nothing to do with the geo-
magnetic storm impact. However, we should note that the
most part of Canada is within the auroral oval area even
under the geomagnetic quiet days. Such environment can
bring ionospheric disturbances and GNSS signal quality
deterioration even under a geomagnetically quiet condi-
tion [7].
Generally both TEQC output data and the WAAS alerts
figure display an obvious shrinking of the % of area cov-
ered in Canada area on June 22nd, 2015 in the time period
from about 09.00 to 22.00 UT under geomagnetic storm
condition. This time period mostly corresponds to the
main phase of the storm. Regardless we did not use any
ionospheric correction the lowest % of area covered for
the TEQC output data is in 20% higher in comparison
with the WAAS alert figure. It can be considered as prob-
able mismatch information or false alarm at the WAAS
output.
3.2 Model Protection Levels and WAAS Alerts
Comparison
A comparison between the previous results and the results
of “model” protection levels computation based on (2) and
(3) was conducted. Fig.10 displays the percent of CONUS
area covered versus UT as a result of HPL (VPL) model
computation. As it was defined in the previous section
the time resolution of HPL and VPL computation was 5
minute. This time period corresponds to the period of the
GIVE values computation in a real WAAS [11].
Figure 10. Modeling results: percent of CONUS area cov-
ered vs Time on Feb. 14th (left panel) and on Feb. 15th (right 
panel), 2011. Red lines mark approximate time points 
which correspond to WAAS alerts (see Fig 1 a).
Comparison between Fig.10 (left panel) and the WAAS 
alert figure on February 14th (Fig 1, b) displays general 
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accordance, especially for LPV200 service. According to 
the modeling results the lowest percent of area covered 
was about 93% for the LPV200 at 22.00-22.30 UT. It was 
expected that this value should be lower in comparison 
with the correspondent WAAS LPV200 alert figure on 
February 14th, 2011 (Fig.1 a), because we did not use any 
ionospheric correction in model computation (2). 
Figure 11. Modeling results: percent of Canada area cov-
ered vs Time on June 20th (left panel) and on June 22nd
(right panel), 2015. The red rectangle marks the time peri-
od which corresponds to the WAAS alerts (see Fig 3 b).
The HPL (VPL) modeling computation displays lower
% of the CONUS area covered on February 15th, 2011 in
comparison to the previous day. The events of the lowest
% of area covered takes place in the time period from
14.00 to 18.00 UT (Fig. 10, right panel) which is gener-
ally coincides with the WAAS alert figure (Fig.1 a). Nev-
ertheless the lowest percent of the area covered was 85%
at about 15.00 UT for the model computation which is in
8-10% less in comparison with the WAAS alert figure for
the same time. On the other hand the LPV200 modelling
computation gets about 95% of the area covered at 17.30
UT which is in 30% higher in comparison with the WAAS
alert for the same time point (Fig.1 a). As the modelling
results gets similar figure to the TEQC output data we can
suppose that such mismatch of alert figures between the
WAAS data and our modeling results displays probable
WAAS false alarm in protection levels computation in this
time period.
Fig.11 displays the percent of Canada area covered ver-
sus UT as a result of the HPL (VPL) model computation.
In contrast to the previous case this modelling computa-
tion displays obvious accordance neither the WAAS alert
figure (Fig.3) nor the real positioning quality figure (Fig.9).
Generally we can see random character of the model LP
(LPV) computation results but there are events of the %
of the area covered decreasing at about 04.00 UT, 12.00
UT and 23.00 UT on both June 20th and June 22nd, 2015.
Probably it can be explained with periodic regular varia-
tions of the local PDOP values in the same local areas.
There is no obvious decreasing in percent of the Can-
ada area covered within the time period from 19.30 to
21.30 UT on June 22, 2015, so there is no accordance
between the modelling results and the WAAS alert fig-
ure this time. There is no significant difference between
the modeling computation results for June 20th and June
22nd, 2015 data in Fig 11. However the lowest value of
the % of the Canada area covered was not lower than 80
% for all protection levels on both days of the observa-
tion. For the LPV 200 protection level this value is in 15-
20% higher comparing to the WAAS alert figure (Fig.3
b). Therefor we see probable mismatch of alert figures be-
tween the WAAS data and our modeling results in above
mentioned environment again.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Firstly, we should point out the random character of the
modelling computation results on June 20-22nd, 2015 
again(Fig 11). One of the probable explanations can be 
that there was the lack of GPS- sites we used to compute 
pro-tection levels in Canada area. On the other hand there 
is a big difference between radio propagation media in 
iono-sphere above the CONUS and the Canada areas.
Fig 12a displays the position of the south border of the
auroral oval versus the UT on June 20th (solid green line)
and on June 22nd, 2015 (dashed red line). This figure was
derived based on the geophysical data (https://iswa.gsfc.
nasa.gov/IswaSystemWebApp/). According to the figure
we can see that most of the Canada is within the auro-
ral oval on both geomagnetically quiet and, especially,
stormy days. It drives us to think that most of the GPS SV
line-of-sight pass through high-latitude ionosphere which
always contents multi-scale ionospheric irregularities in
contrast to the mid-latitude ionosphere (i.e. above the
CONUS zone). The main conclusion rises that we may
not use the same solution and the same data set of WAAS
reference stations (WRS) to reconstruct the ionospheric
GIVE values in the same manner for both Canada and
CONUS areas.
There is no obvious accordance in time behavior be-
tween the modeled LP (LPV) time series (Fig. 11, right
panel), dynamics of the ovation prime energy flux of elec-
trons and ions (Fig.12 b) and dynamics of the auroral oval
south border(Fig 12a). On the other hand a coincidence in 
time can be noticed between the WAAS alert (Fig.2 b) 
and peak of the ovation prime energy flux of electrons 
and ions at 20.00 UT (Fig.12 b). It is interesting result 
which displays a contradiction between the real 
positioning quality and expected protection levels based 
on the model representa-tions of the GIVE values.
Regardless the peak of the ovation prime energy flux
took place at 20.00 UT the most part of the flux energy
fell on the North Atlantic, Europe and North of Russia that
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time. Indeed we can see that this energy flux did not bring
significant motion in the south border of the auroral oval
in the North America (Fig.12a). On the other hand the first
lower peak of the ovation prime energy flux at 07.00 UT
(Fig.12b) mostly fells on the North America and 
inspired significant shifting in the auroral oval border 
toward the south. However it did not bring noticeable 
features in both WAAS alert figure and real positioning 
quality results.
Our results display some cases of significant mismatch
between the WAAS alert figure and real positioning qual-
ity for both the CONUS zone and Canada. This mismatch
was proved by means of the model computation of HPL
(VPL) values based on the real ionospheric ranging errors
which were derived from the GPS sites within CONUS
zone and Canada. The WAAS alerts got the expected per-
cent of area covered which is much lower in comparison
to the real positioning data for both the GPS standalone
mode and the model HPL (VPL) computation in the most
cases under consideration.
Figure 12. South border of the auroral oval dynamics and 
solar particles energy: panel a) position of the south bor-
der of the auroral oval vs time on June 20th (solid green 
line) and on June 22nd, 2015 (dashed red line); panel b) 
ovation prime energy flux (electrons+ ions precipitation 
within aurora) vs time on June 20th (solid green line) and 
on June 22nd, 2015 (dashed red line).
As it was shown the WAAS integrity service provides 
general response on the geomagnetic storm. Some partic-
ular cases, however, can be considered as probable false 
alarm of the HAL (VAL) exceeding. Indeed the WAAS 
alert figure gives much lower expected positioning avail-
ability under the geomagnetic storm conditions in com-
parison to our results at 17.40 UT on February 15th, 2011 
and at 19.45-21.35 UT on June 22nd, 2015. In the first 
case, the real positioning quality according to the LPV 
and LPV200 requirements is provided more than 90 % 
percent of the CONUS area covered. This value is much 
higher comparing to the correspondent WAAS report (less 
than 70%) for the same conditions. Model HPL and VPL 
computation based on the real ionospheric ranging errors 
get the lowest percent of the area covered which is about 
93% for CONUS zone. And again this is much higher in 
comparison to the WAAS alert figure for the same date 
and time. 
We should emphasize that much better agreement be-
tween WAAS alert figure, real positioning and modelling 
data was achieved for the event on February 15th, 2011 
in comparison to the one on June 22nd, 2015. It proba-
bly proves that the WAAS algorithm reacts better on the 
system outages events (see Table 2) than on geomagnetic 
storm, especially under high-latitude ionosphere envi-
ronment. In our opinion such disagreement between the 
WAAS alert figure and our computation results can be 
caused by multi-scale ionospheric irregularities which are 
generated in the period of geomagnetic storm and can dis-
rupt the correct GIVE values computations. 
Based on the long time previous results it has been 
accepted that geomagnetic storms bring increasing in 
intensity of all-scale disturbances of the ionospheric to-
tal electron content (TEC) within the Globe [17,18,19]. This 
idea was reflected in the GPS and WAAS ionospheric 
standard models which are in the base of GIVE value 
computations. Such approach however is not able to take 
into account the real multi-scale ionospheric disturbances. 
These disturbances mostly affect GNSS performance in 
local areas which are associated with the travelling pattern 
of the ionospheric irregular structure not only in high and 
low latitudes bot also in mid-latitudes.
In spite of the mid-latitude ionosphere usually does 
not contain the sources to generate significant multi-scale 
ionospheric disturbances both the equatorial and the po-
lar areas can bring ones into the mid- latitudes especially 
under magnetic storm conditions [20-22]. Low-latitude ion-
osphere contents specific ionospheric disturbances which 
are known as “ionospheric super-bubble”. These “bubbles” 
can penetrate in mid-latitudes up to 35-37°N under geo-
magnetic storm conditions [21]. On the other hand polar 
ionosphere can be a source of strong large-scale travelling 
ionospheric disturbances which are generated within the 
pulsing boarder of the auroral oval area and propagate to-
ward the mid-latitudes as well [7].
Analyzing the ionospheric effects of numerous of 
magnetic storms in a period from 2000 to 2004 it was 
found that a region with intense with multi-scale electron 
density irregularities emerges during magnetic storms on 
the border of the auroral oval. The region of increased in-
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tensity of these irregularities can have a large spatial scale
(hundreds and thousands kilometers) and travel following
the uniformly moving or pulsating auroral oval border
[7]. The instantaneous pattern of ionospheric irregularities
distribution is heterogeneous in space and rapidly changes
in time. It means that we must not expect global concur-
rent effect of the geomagnetic disturbances in GNSS and
WAAS performance. It is more likely that the geomagnet-
ic storm effects bring local sharp positioning quality dete-
rioration. It can happen suddenly anytime not only within
the main phase of geomagnetic storm but also within
during its recovering phase.
All the above mentioned probably tells that it is nec-
essary to revise the main WAAS building concept taking
into account the latitudinal features of the ionosphere. The
main concept of the WAAS integrity monitoring is that
the confidence bounds of expected ranging errors must be
large enough to describe the error in the correction, but
tight enough to allow the operation to proceed.  If it is not
possible to distinguish between nominal and disturbed
conditions, then we must always assume disturbed condi-
tions are present. As we could see earlier this concept may
get false alarm.
In case the main concept of the WAAS integrity mon-
itoring has to stay the same, there are two main ideas to
solve the above mentioned contradiction. Firstly, we can
find a solution to detect ionospheric irregularities so that
we can provide a high level of service during undisturbed
time periods [23,24]. A reduced level of expected service
would only be necessary during periods of detected ion-
ospheric disturbances [23]. In order to realize this solution
in practice the detection scheme of the ionospheric distur-
bances must be extremely robust, in order to provide the
necessary level of protection. The integrity requirements
for precision approach guidance set the probability of
hazardously misleading information below 10-7 per ap-
proach. Therefore, the chance of an undetected ionospher-
ic irregularity must be at a similarly small level. Taking
into account the above mentioned, it is unlikely to achieve
such high probability of undetected multi-scale ionospher-
ic disturbances even in mid-latitudes let alone high and
low latitude areas.
Secondly, WAAS can also be modernized to take ad-
vantage of new signals of all global positioning systems
(GLONASS, BeiDou, GALILEO, QZSS etc) and GEOs.
Indeed by only upgrading the WAAS Reference Station
(WRS) receivers to measure Galileo signals we can dou-
ble our sampling of the ionosphere. The increased sam-
pling translates into smaller broadcast confidence values
on the single frequency ionospheric corrections. These
lower values lead to higher availability. Similarly, the
L5 signal has better noise properties and can be acquired 
at a lower elevation angle. This leads less uncertainty in 
the ionospheric measurements and to smaller confidence 
bounds as well [25]. In reality, however, serious unpredicted 
obstacles were unfolded in common multi-system signal 
data processing. GPS TEC measurements for the GIVE 
computation, although highly precise, are often rendered 
inaccurately due to satellite and receiver differential code 
biases (DCBs). Calculated satellite DCB values are now 
available from a variety of sources, but receiver DCBs 
generally remain an undertaking of the receiver operators 
and processing centers [26,27,28].
The other serious problem here is comprised in signifi-
cant difference in ranging errors accuracy from all current 
positioning system and another ranging data sources. For 
example, a consistent analysis of signal-in-space ranging 
errors (SISREs) was conducted for all current satellite 
navigation systems, considering both global average val-
ues and worst-user-location statistics. Global average SIS-
RE values for the individual constellations amount to 0.7 
± 0.02 m (GPS), 1.5 ± 0.1 m (BeiDou), 1.6 ± 0.3 m (Gal-
ileo), 1.9 ± 0.1 m (GLONASS), and 0.6 ± 0.2 m (QZSS) 
over a 12-month period in 2013/2014 [27].
Besides  this we should take into account that some 
anomalies in particular SV ranging are also possible. As 
an example of it GPS satellite oscillator anomalies mim-
icking ionospheric phase scintillation can be pointed out. 
Such ranging anomalies can be expected from an anomaly 
in the satellite’s oscillators which are a persistent phenom-
enon. They have the potential to generate false alarms in 
the systems to forewarn of GPS outages due to the iono-
spheric scintillation [29,30].
And finally, the capability of GNSS receivers to track 
multiple GNSS signals poses the problem of mutual align-
ments of reference frames and time scales [31]. System 
biases should possibly be computed in advance and made 
known to the user, so that the only unknowns for code 
point positioning are the receiver coordinates and the re-
ceiver clock offset relative to a unique time scale [28].
In our opinion in order to achieve high confidence of 
WAAS positioning availability alerts real ionospheric 
measurements within the wide area coverage zone must 
be involved instead of the WAAS GIVE values [33]. The 
better way to realize this idea is to combine the WAAS 
and LAAS solutions. According to [12] in order to form the 
ranging confidence bounds the real ranging which were 
collected from WRSs in WAAS coverage zone are decom-
posed as following
2 2 2 2 2
TOT flt UIRE air tropσ σ σ σ σ= + + +   (7)
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These terms correspond to: the satellite clock and 
ephemeris corrections error (σflt), the ionospheric correc-
tion error (σUIRE), the code noise, multipath error (σair), and 
the troposphere error (σtrop). 
According to their impact on the final UDRE and 
GIVE values we can divide these errors into two groups: 1) 
the global ranging correction errors which do not depend 
on the user’s location within WAAS coverage zone and 
2) the locally dependent ranging correction errors which 
are strictly dependent on the user’s position within WAAS 
coverage zone. The first group of the errors contains the 
satellite clock and ephemeris corrections error (σflt) as well 
as differential code biases for SVs and the second group 
shell include tropospheric, ionospheric and multipath er-
rors.
WAAS can provide high confident corrections and in-
tegrity monitoring for the first group ranging errors within 
the coverage zone in any geophysical environment. On the 
other hand the σUIRE, σair and σtrop components are strictly 
dependent on the local environment of radio wave propa-
gation. There are a numerous research which proves low 
confidence of locally dependent ranging corrections under 
geomagnetic storms, solar radio flares and another irregu-
lar external impacts. Probably it means that better solution 
is to get these ranging error statistics not from WAAS out-
put but from the local GNSS-sites output. Today there are 
several types of such local GNSS networks which can be 
considered to involve in the above mentioned implemen-
tation: Geodynamics and geophysical services network, 
like GEONET, IGS, RTK-networks; Local Area DGPS; 
the WAAS WRSs sites etc.
The σUIRE, σair and σtrop statistics can be collected at the 
above mentioned local GNSS sites and broadcast to the 
nearest users within a local coverage zone. Combining 
“global” ranging correction with locally dependent rang-
ing corrections the user equipment can use both WAAS 
and Local network ranging data statistics to compute cor-
respondent HPL (VPL) with higher confidence.
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